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Transcendental Aspects, Ontological Commitments and Naturalistic Elements  
 in Nietzsche’s Thought. 
 
 
 In what follows I shall focus on Nietzsche’s views on knowledge and leave aside such 
questions as to whether, for example, his understanding of morality should be considered as 
naturalistic or not. Even from this restricted perspective, the interesting thing about Nietzsche is 
that he is a particularly tricky case: he has been characterised as a philosopher in the transcendental 
tradition (Green 2002) and more often as a naturalist and an empiricist (Leiter 2002, Clark 1990 & 
2001, Richardson 2004, and in more nuanced way, Cox 1999).1 Prima facie (and perhaps 
worryingly), there are justifications for both views, in spite of their apparent incompatibility. Thus, 
Nietzsche has claimed that human experience is necessarily structured according to ‘a priori forms’ 
(TL: 87). He has argued for a form of transcendental idealism, making both the ontological 
assumption that there is a way in which things are in themselves and the epistemological claim that 
such things are a ‘mysterious X’ (TL: 83), by definition beyond the scope of human knowledge. Yet 
in a more naturalistic fashion he also has suggested that philosophy should model its inquiry and 
method on the sciences, and take into accounts their results. In spite of his disagreement with 
Darwin on the question of the preservation of life, he has promoted a view of human nature as 
determined by evolutionary principles. Furthermore, he has rejected both the idea of a Hinterwelt 
and of the appearances/thing-in-itself distinction, in a way which seems to preclude the dualism 
inherent to transcendental idealism. And as if endorsing central elements of both naturalism and 
transcendental philosophy was not tricky enough, Nietzsche also seemingly held a view that denies 
a central feature shared by these two trends: he apparently rejected the possibility of objective 
knowledge (his so-called error theory). This has led others (in particular Derrida 1979, De Man 
1979, and Kofman 1993) think that he is a proto-deconstructionist, whose purpose is to undermine 
the ideal of secure knowledge which underlies both naturalistic and transcendental projects.  
1 Contrary to Clark and Leiter, Cox takes into account Nietzsche’s repeated attacks against science: thus 
Nietzsche ‘uncovers a residual theology in the modern scientific project’s claim to describe the way the world 
really is’ (Cox 1999, 6). Cox argues that science must ‘overcome itself’ into aesthetic discourse, and that such 
self-overcoming is ‘more rigorously naturalistic’ (probably in the sense that it is more thoroughly non 
metaphysical) than the scientific project ⎯ a view which presumably neither Clark nor Leiter would be 




                                                     
 The main way to at least reduce the confusion is to look at things chronologically. In this 
regard, the dominant interpretation (put forward by pro-naturalistic interpreters such as M. Clark 
and B. Leiter) is that while the early Nietzsche, under the influence of Kant and Schopenhauer, was 
a transcendental idealist, he soon renounced the mistaken ways of his youth and became a 
naturalist. To put it simply, the Nietzsche of Truth and Lies believed both in the existence of things-
in-themselves beyond the empirical realm and in their unknowability. Correlatively, this early 
commitment to transcendental idealism is seen as the main ground for his error theory: since its 
empirical nature prevents it from capturing the essence of things-in-themselves, all human 
knowledge is by definition erroneous. Yet from Human All Too Human onwards Nietzsche would 
have started to have doubts about the existence of things-in-themselves, and ultimately rejected the 
notion as well as the rather inconvenient error theory it warranted. This would have paved the way 
for a naturalistic epistemology characterised by his alleged enthusiasm for the sciences,2 his 
emphasis on the continuity between philosophy and science and a ‘non metaphysical’ commitment 
to what Clark calls ‘common sense realism’, i.e. the belief in the existence of mind independent 
empirical objects (Clark 1993: 61. See chapter 2 in general).  
 In my view, the problem with this neat reconstruction is that it oversimplifies both 
Nietzsche’s early position and his philosophical development.3 The main reason for this is that it 
implicitly rests on two unwarranted assumptions: firstly, that transcendental idealism can be 
uncontroversially identified with a two-world view and the strong ontological commitment to the 
autonomous existence of things-in-themselves it entails; secondly, that being a transcendental 
idealist in this robust sense is the only way to cash out transcendental claims.4 Yet as it is well-
2 There are many other passages, both in the published and unpublished work, which suggest (contra Clark or 
Leiter) that science does not enjoy any particular epistemic privilege for Nietzsche: thus ‘science at its best 
seeks most to keep us in this simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably constructed and suitably falsified world 
(...) ⎯ it loves error because, being alive, it loves life’ (BGE 24). Or again, ‘physicists believe in a “true world” 
of their own fashion: a firm systematisation of atoms in necessary motion (...). But they are in error. The atom 
they posit is inferred according to the logic of the perspectivism of consciousness’ (WP §636). Perhaps the 
most lapidary formula is the following one: ‘ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has 
imported into them; the finding is called science’ (WP §606). 
3 Another difficulty, noted by many commentators (in particular Poellner, Cox and Green) is that this 
reconstruction is not supported by uncontroversial textual evidence, and leaves out the entirety of the 
Nachlass. Having said that, I should say that in other regards, I am sympathetic to Leiter and Clark’s approach, 
which I have often found illuminating. In particular, I completely agree with Leiter’s criticism of the 
interpretations of Nietzsche that see him as a precursor of post-modernism intent on denying the possibility 
of any truth and objectivity (cf. Leiter 1994).  
4 There are other, related problems with the naturalistic line of interpretation. Of particular relevance is the 
fact that it rests on a mistaken definition of transcendental philosophy as ‘the search for a priori modes of 




                                                                                                                                                                       
known, deflationary interpretations such as Bird’s (Bird 1962) or Allison’s (Allison 1983) reject the 
two-world view in favour of a two-aspect reading which radically minimises the ontological 
commitments of transcendental idealism in order to emphasise its epistemological ambit, i.e. its 
attempt to secure the possibility of objective empirical knowledge by identifying its a priori 
necessary conditions. Interpretations such as Strawson’s (Strawson 1966) go even further in this 
direction by arguing that the best way to bolster this epistemological core is to strip away the 
ontological commitments entirely. In this paper, I shall suggest that likewise, Nietzsche had a much 
more nuanced view of transcendental idealism than is attributed to him by his pro-naturalistic 
readers, and that he too was concerned with prying apart its ontological and epistemological 
dimensions. By means of a close re-examination of a text central to Clark’s own interpretation, 
namely ‘Truth and Lies’, I shall establish that his early views about the existence of things-in-
themselves are accompanied by a separate analysis of perception which concludes that our 
experience now has what looks like transcendental conditions5 in that it is necessarily structured by 
 
another passage defines ‘metaphysical or a priori knowledge as non empirical access to reality and a basis for 
rejecting the relevance of sense testimony’ (Clark 1993: 71)). Yet Kant’s ambition was not to reject the 
relevance of sense testimony, but to show that it is not sufficient, per se, to account for the possibility of 
knowledge. Moreover, defining transcendental knowledge in this way is tantamount to reverting to a pre-
Kantian understanding of the a priori: for Descartes or Leibniz, having a priori knowledge is indeed 
equivalent to having innate ideas which provide us with non empirically acquired information about such 
metaphysical issues as the nature of the soul or the existence of God. But as it is well known, Kant was as keen 
as Hume (although for different reasons) to reject the idea that we could have a priori knowledge of 
metaphysical essences. More generally, many of the naturalistically inclined Nietzsche interpreters often do 
not define what they mean by ‘transcendental philosophy’, nor the ways in which they think it is opposed to 
naturalism. As a result, the criteria they use to argue in favour of Nietzsche’s ‘naturalism’ are often indecisive, 
because they would equally well apply to a transcendental philosopher and/or rely on an unsubTL:e view of 
transcendental philosophy. The reasons for this, I think, are parTL:y historical, and parTL:y due to the context 
of Nietzsche studies. Thus the rise of naturalism (and of proto-naturalist movements such as materialism in 
the 18th century or positivism in the 19th century) was mosTL:y targeted at metaphysics rather than at 
transcendental philosophy. There are traces of this, for example, in the often quoted Quinean definition of 
naturalism as the rejection of ‘first philosophy’. ConsequenTL:y many of the arguments offered in favour of 
the naturalistic reading of Nietzsche are grounded in his rejection of metaphysics. Correlatively, this anti-
metaphysical bend is accentuated by the perceived need to oppose interpretations ⎯ one of the first and most 
famous being Heidegger’s ⎯  which emphasise the resurgence of metaphysical aspects in Nietzsche’s thought. 
However as indicated above Kant was equally distrustful of what he called ‘dogmatic’ metaphysics. Because 
they often do not take this into account, the naturalistically inclined readers of Nietzsche, while they have 
litTL:e trouble showing that he does not want to be a metaphysician, fail to argue convincingly against his 
being a transcendental philosopher. 
5 By this I mean, in the most general way possible, conditions which a) are non empirical, non causal 
conditions of possibility; b) are modally necessary and presuppose a normative conception of knowledge, 
prescribing what must be the case (rather than just describing what is the case) in order for us to be able to 
know anything; c) consequenTL:y, involve a bid for universality and are governed by a distinctively 




                                                                                                                                                                       
‘a priori forms’ (TL: 87), amongst which time, space, succession and coexistence. These conditions 
are identified independently from any ontological commitments, through a proto-genealogical 
study of the evolution of human perception. Given this dual angle, it is no longer possible to 
conclude, as Leiter and Clark do, that Nietzsche's later revision of his early views about things-in-
themselves is tantamount to a rejection of transcendental idealism simpliciter, nor that it results in 
the elimination of all possible transcendental aspects in his thought6. In fact, his reflection on his 
previous ontological commitments is much more subtle than is usually allowed for: as we shall see, 
it warrants the passage from a robust to an ultra-deflationary position which establishes the need to 
remain agnostic about ontological commitments (rather than rejecting them, which per se is 
another form of robust commitment). Correlatively, Nietzsche’s philosophical itinerary can be 
fruitfully interpreted as a deepening of his early thoughts on the nature of the conditions of 
possibility of experience, and thus as the development of the epistemological heritage of 
transcendental idealism.  
 In a similar way, the so-called error theory is not so easily explained away by Nietzsche’s 
abandonment of his earlier beliefs in the existence of things-in-themselves. As seen by Clark, it does 
remove one of its grounds, namely the impossible demand for a metaphysical adequation between 
human knowledge and the essence of things considered in themselves. However TL offers a second, 
independent argument for the error theory: regardless of any ontological commitments, it infers 
from the contrast between our current perceptual experience and a different, more primordial form 
of experience (relegated to a mythical past) that the structuration of the former by a priori elements 
is in itself a form of falsification. As we shall see, this early claim is developed by later Nietzsche’s 
reflection on the perspectival conditions of life and their relation both to the primal stream of our 
impressions and what he calls the ‘world of becoming’. Unless an alternative interpretation which 
does not simply rest on Nietzsche's rejection of his early robust ontological commitments is 
proposed, the error theory will thus remain a serious obstacle to all interpreters (naturalistically and 
transcendentally inclined) which seek to find in Nietzsche’s thought a ground for the possibility of 
objective knowledge. 
 Once the complexity of the relation between ontological commitments, transcendental 
aspects and naturalistic elements in Nietzsche’s work is fully acknowledged, new questions arise, on 
 
knowledge). I shall discuss the notion further along in the paper, in particular when examining Nietzsche's 




                                                                                                                                                                       
which I shall focus the second part of this paper: clearly the thrust of Nietzsche's analysis in TL is 
both to assert the existence of ‘transcendental’ conditions and to show that they have an empirical 
genesis, which of course throws their transcendental status into question (hence my use of 
quotation marks) and attests to the presence of strong naturalistic elements in his thought (in 
particular because of his Humean insistence on the part played by belief, habit and social practices 
in the genesis of our ‘a priori’ forms). So how should we construe Nietzsche's so-called 
‘naturalisation’ of the transcendental7, and what are its consequences for the idea of transcendental 
conditions (in particular, re: their modality and their scope)? Secondly, how do the ontological and 
epistemological dimensions of transcendental idealism fare in later Nietzsche’s work? Finally, and 
most importantly, is it possible to interpret his error theory in a way that doesn’t radically threaten 
the possibility of his having coherent views about knowledge (be they naturalistic or 
transcendental)?  
 Allow me one more remark before I turn to a close examination of these issues: it should be 
clear from what precedes that my aim in this paper will not be to make a case for Nietzsche being 
either a naturalist or a transcendental philosopher. I do not think that it is possible to decide either 
way, let alone to identify, as Clark and Leiter do, an evolution from an early, transcendentally 
inclined position to a more mature, naturalistic one. For reasons that will appear progressively, I 
don’t even think that one should decide either way. The idea here is rather to examine the 
interaction of naturalistic and transcendental elements in Nietzsche’s thought with a view to 
identifying nodes of tension, and the way they unfold in his work. As we shall see, such tensions 
focus mostly on a) the question of whether experience is actively constituted by the mind or 
passively received through the senses, b) the status of the constituting forms and concepts (a priori 
or not), c) the problem of whether such a conception of experience requires the existence of a mind 
independent reality (and if so, how experience relates to the latter), and d) depending on the 
answers provided to the first three questions, the scope and validity of human knowledge. In the 
course of examining these tensions, I shall suggest that perhaps the most profitable hermeneutic 
hypothesis is to see Nietzsche's struggle with them as an attempt to overcome the strict opposition 
 
6 Cf. Clark 1990: 61: ‘in fact there is nothing at all transcendental about the position I attribute to Nietzsche. 
Nothing I attribute to him is out of accord with Rorty’s view that “philosophy will have no more to offer than 
common sense (supplemented by biology, history, etc.) about knowledge and truth”’. 
7 The expression was coined by Stack. However he was mosTL:y interested in showing the extent of Lange’s 
influence on Nietzsche's thought; my own concern is not so much with the history of ideas as with the 




                                                     
between naturalism and transcendental philosophy. It is this third way, with its theoretical benefits 
and costs, which I want to explore in this paper.  
 
 What makes ‘Truth and Lies’ (henceforth TL) particularly interesting is that it can be seen as 
a matrix in which most of the strands of Nietzsche’s views on knowledge are already present. The 
text is notoriously complex, and has been the object of numerous interpretations.8 While it is 
obviously an attack against the possibility of universal truth and objective knowledge, what is far 
less clear is Nietzsche's strategy. The main reason for such complication is that TL constantly 
intertwines two main lines of argumentation, which both have their source in a reflection on 
transcendental idealism. On the one hand, and most obviously, Nietzsche infers from the lack of 
metaphysical correspondence between empirical knowledge and things-in-themselves that our 
knowledge is ‘anthropomorphic’ and therefore invalid from a transcendental point of view. As we 
shall see, per se this is not a particularly good point. Yet on the other hand, there is a more subtle 
argument: Nietzsche is concerned, not only with what he sees as the failure of human knowledge to 
adequately capture the in itself, but also with describing the conditions of possibility of experience 
in a way that remains agnostic about their possible ontological implications. In doing so, he first 
presents an anti-rationalist view of perception as ‘metaphorical’: such a view can be interpreted as 
both anti-Kantian (it rejects the claim that experience is constituted by means of objective 
judgments) and anti-empiricist (it denies that there is any raw sense data). It then turns out, 
however, that this view is supposed to describe the way things were experienced in a mythical and 
forgotten past, and does not reflect the way we perceive anymore. In order to explain the changes 
in perceptual conditions, Nietzsche offers a fairly Humean description of the ways in which 
conceptualisation was made necessary by the development of new social practices (the need for 
truthfulness) and habits. This proto-genealogical account, however, culminates unexpectedly in a 
quasi-Kantian vision of experience as now shaped by ‘a priori forms’ (TL: 87). Before analysing the 
substantial changes the second account brings to the idea of transcendental conditions, I shall 
endeavour to flesh out and clarify the successive steps of this rather dizzying argument, with a view 
to bringing out both its transcendental and naturalistic aspects, and their mutual tensions. 
8 In particular De Man, Kofman, Clark. While De Man and Kofman read TL: as a deconstructionist analysis of 
language (as metaphorical), Clark insists holds that the main object of the text is to provide a 
Schopenhauerian criticism of representation as fundamentally inadequate to the in-itself. While I agree with 
Clark that the text should be read as an engagement with transcendental idealism, I do not think that this is 




                                                     
 As seen by Clark, TL’s attack against objectivity does not rest on an analysis of language, but 
of perception (thus the metaphors Nietzsche describes are ‘perceptual’ (TL: 84) and, as we shall see, 
both pre-verbal and pre-linguistic). The perceptual process is detailed as follows: ‘a nerve stimulus is 
transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated into a sound: second 
metaphor’ (TL: 81).9 Per se, there is nothing here that suggests an endorsement of transcendental 
idealism. Prima facie, the description is pitched at the empirical level and concerns the genesis of 
representations. As it is very compressed, it is worth looking at into more detail. According to 
Aristotle (Poetics 1457b), a metaphor is the ‘application of a strange term either transferred from 
the genus and applied to the species, or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one 
species to another or else by analogy’.10 No rules or conditions are specified for such transfer (meta-
phorein). In the case of a transfer from species to genus (or vice versa) there is clearly a relation of 
kinship between the two terms considered, but this is not the case when the metaphor links two 
species ‘or else’. By virtue of their analogical nature, metaphors point out a similarity between the 
two terms considered (although strictly speaking an analogy involves four terms, paired two by two, 
and concerns the relation between the two pairs rather than the terms themselves). But such 
similarity is not grounded in an objective consideration of the nature of the objects linked: the 
connection is subjective, and the resulting judgment, taken literally, would be false. The purpose of 
such a connection is not to form any knowledge of the objects, but to stimulate the imagination so 
that it bridges the gap between two terms which per se have little in common, and engages in a free 
play of significations. Thus Paul Eluard’s verse, ‘the earth is blue like an orange’, does not disclose 
any objective facts about the earth or oranges. However the metaphor brings to mind aspects in 
which they could be thought of as similar (such as roundness, natural character, fertility, pitted 
surface, etc.); the way in which it does this is by sparking an imaginative, almost immediate vision 
rather than by making us reflect on the nature of the objects (although it is possible, as I have 
started to do, to articulate after the fact some of the connections established).  
   How does this apply to perception? Nietzsche’s idea seems to be that just as metaphors 
involve a transfer of meaning from one term to another which does not reflect their objective 
characteristics so much as the workings of the imagination, in the same way in the case of 
perception there is no objective, necessary or rational connection between nerve stimuli, images 
9 The process is detailed in almost similar terms in a later passage: ‘first images ⎯ to explain how images arise 
in the spirit. Then words, applied to images. Finally concepts, possible only when there are words ⎯ the 
collecting of many images in something non visible but audible (word)’. (WP §506, 1884).  




                                                     
and sounds. They are all different in nature and the passage from one to another is only made 
possible by the subjective power of our imagination, seen as a primal, artistic power upon which 
there are, originally, no conceptual constraints.11 It has ‘no need for [concepts], those makeshifts of 
indigence’ (TL: 90). Thus we are ‘artistically creative subjects’ (TL: 86) and sounds are the 
‘coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of imagination 
like a fiery liquid’ (TL: 86). Along the same lines, Nietzsche speaks of the ‘drive towards the 
formation of metaphors’ as ‘the fundamental human drive’ (TL: 88): we are animated by ‘an ardent 
desire to refashion the world (...) so that it will be as colourful, (...) charming, and eternally new as 
the world of dreams’ (TL: 89). As it depends purely on the idiosyncrasies on the perceiving 
individual, each ‘perceptual metaphor’ is singular and ‘without equal’. This also applies to the 
‘words’ used to convey the images: their assimilation to mere sounds, and the fact that they are 
distinct from concepts (and do not require the latter for their formation) suggests that this proto-
language is extremely rudimentary. It clearly has no grammar, no logical connectors, no verbs, etc. 
Each ‘word’ is likely to be an onomatopoeia functioning like a proper name, associated by further 
metaphorical transfer to an individual image after the latter has been independently formed by the 
imagination. Because there are no conceptual constraints on the power of the imagination, neither 
the images nor the words coalesce into an ordered world of representations, but are ‘irregular, 
lacking in results and coherence’ (TL: 89). Correlatively, as there are no common structures for 
their formation and all perceptual metaphor are private, there is no intersubjectively shared world.  
 Although it is problematic12, such a view is interesting in that it seems aimed both at 
transcendental and empiricist accounts of experience. It is clearly an attack against the Kantian 
understanding of experience as dependent on judgments which would bind intuitions into objective 
representations. For one thing, the formation of images as described here is said not to involve any 
concepts (as we shall see, for Nietzsche the latter arise from the equalisation of pre-existing 
perceptual differences), which removes the possibility of judgment as unification of the manifold 
under a rule. Correlatively, the idea that representations are perceptual metaphors suggests that 
there is no need for such a possibility anyway: the process can be thought of as purely associative. 
At one point, Nietzsche claims explicitly that ‘metonymy lies at the essence of synthetic judgment’ 
(PT152). Along the same lines, his insistence on the exclusive part played by the imagination in the 
11 Later in the text, Nietzsche will offer a proto-genealogy of the empirical reasons why this primal creative 




                                                                                                                                                                       
formation of representations can be seen as an indirect attack on the notion of schematism. In the 
first Critique, the role of the imagination is limited to bridging the gap between sensibility and 
understanding by making sure that our categorial framework can apply to intuitions.13 Thus the 
purpose of the imaginative schemata (as determinate pure intuitions) is to enable the unification of 
sensory impressions under the rule of the pure concepts of the understanding. Here, Nietzsche lifts 
such limitations by removing the need for any kind of conceptualisation.14 However there are also 
some strongly anti-empiricist elements in his account. For one thing, most empiricists, although 
they deny that experience is conceptually united, still grant that it has regularity. Thus for Hume 
our mental associations are not free: they are regulated, not by a priori concepts or forms, but by 
psychological principles such as resemblance, contiguity or causality. Yet this is rejected by 
Nietzsche’s insistence on the ‘arbitrary’ (TL: 82) power of the imagination and the irregularity and 
lack of coherence of our perceptual metaphors. Secondly both the notion of metaphor itself and the 
idea that the activity of the imagination is ‘primal’ suggest that there is nothing which would count 
as a raw sense datum, passively imprinted on the mind. On the contrary, for something to count as a 
perceptual content there is need of the interpretative activity of the imagination (which is why the 
relation between stimulus and image is not merely causal). The very disjunction of the spheres of 
nervous impulse and image suggests that a pure nervous stimulus could not register on the mind nor 
become significant for us unless it was interpreted by the imagination. As Nietzsche puts it, a 
stimulus must be ‘seen as red, another as blue’, or ‘heard as a sound’ (TL: 87, my italics). Per se, it is 
neither blue nor red: it is nothing to us. The ‘artistic’ power of the imagination thus lies in its ability 
to transpose nervous stimuli into images which are meaningful for us.15
 
12 Amongst other things, one could argue that it is difficult to understand how ‘images’ could be formed 
without any conceptual input. Moreover, it would be difficult to distinguish between two different images if 
one could not avail oneself to such concepts as coexistence, succession, etc. I shall return to these issues later. 
13 cf. A136/B175 : schematism provides the ‘sensible conditions [the schemata] under which alone pure 
concepts of the understanding can be employed’.  
14 One might be tempted to say that Nietzsche is shifting to an aesthetic perspective, according to which the 
imagination schematises without concepts. However even the Third Critique requires the existence of a 
sensus communis, and the postulation that reflective judgments can be universal, two requirements which are 
clearly not endorsed by Nietzsche’s account of perceptual metaphors here.  
15 As we shall see, this anti-empiricist spirit remains present until the end of Nietzsche’s work: thus, 
‘everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematised, interpreted through and 
though’ (WP §477, nov 1887-March 1888), or again ‘everything that enters consciousness as a ‘unity’ is 
already tremendously complex’ (WP § 489). However, it should be noted that it sits ill at ease with 
Nietzsche’s anti-conceptualism in his early account of perceptual metaphors. Further along in TL:, and also in 




                                                     
 So the first way of understanding Nietzsche’s brief comments on the metaphorical nature of 
perception is to construe them as an independent description which does not rely on any 
ontological assumptions: it is purely based on an internal analysis of the genesis of our 
representations which denies the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments without, however, 
endorsing an empiricist view of experience. Yet Nietzsche immediately (and rather confusingly) 
shifts the discussion to another, more metaphysically loaded, level: his analysis of perception is now 
itself taken as a metaphor illustrating the inscrutable relation of human knowledge to what is seen 
as the essence of things. The focus moves imperceptibly from the idea that the genesis of perceptual 
experience does not warrant the possibility of objective empirical knowledge to the claim that it is 
impossible for our representations to correspond to the true nature of things anyway. The argument 
here is not that objectivity is a priori impossible: it is that even if it was possible (and thus if we 
could have true knowledge of the empirical world), still our representations would fail to describe 
the world as it is. We would be in a situation analogous to that of a deaf person contemplating 
Chladni’s figures: seeing the waves produced by sound on sand would get us no closer to 
understanding what sound is, and would just leave us puzzled.16 Thus ‘a painter without hands who 
wished to express in song the picture before his mind would, by means of this substitution of 
spheres, still reveal more about the essence of things than does the empirical world’ (TL: 87). 
Nietzsche seems to lean towards a phenomenalist view of transcendental idealism17, and to claim 
that there is a radical disconnection between the world of empirical representations and the 
noumenal world of essences. He suggests two reasons for this: firstly, he rejects the 
(Schopenhauerian) idea that there could be a causal relation between the thing in-itself and the 
stimuli we receive: ‘the further inference from the nerve stimulus to a cause outside of us is already 
the result of a false and unjustifiable application of the principle of sufficient reason’ (TL: 82). 
Between appearances and things-in-themselves, as between stimulus and image, there is only a 
metaphorical, subjectively established relation: ‘in the same way as the sound appears as a sand 
figure, so the mysterious X of the thing in itself first appears as a nerve stimulus, then as an image, 
and finally as a sound’ (TL: 83). Secondly, even if there was a causal relation between thing-in-itself 
and appearances, still this would give us no understanding of the thing-in-itself: if we thought so, 
we would be as mistaken as a deaf person who, having ‘discovered the cause [of the sand waves] in 
16 ‘Perhaps such a [totally deaf] person will gaze with astonishment at Chladni’s sound figures: perhaps he will 
discover their causes in the vibrations of the string and will now swear that he must know what men mean by 




                                                                                                                                                                       
the vibrations of the string’, was now to ‘swear that he must know what men mean by “sound”’ (TL: 
83). Nietzsche therefore concludes that ‘nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, but 
only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us’ (TL: 83).  
 This second, better known, line of argument, which is based on the impossibility for human 
knowledge to apply to the noumenal world, is both close and substantially different from Kant’s 
own position. Clearly, Nietzsche is committed to the ontological thesis that there is a way in which 
things are in themselves, independently from us, and to the epistemological claim that such things, 
considered from a transcendental perspective (i.e.: that of the bracketing of epistemic conditions), 
are by definition unknowable for us. However, the latter was not a problem for Kant’s 
epistemology: the fact that we cannot know anything of the essence of things considered 
independently of epistemic conditions is a consequence of transcendental idealism, not an argument 
against the possibility of objectivity in the empirical world. Yet Nietzsche introduces another 
requirement, that of metaphysical correspondence: he thinks that in order to count as knowledge, 
our statements must adequately reflect the way things are independently of us. As this is by 
definition impossible, Nietzsche concludes that human knowledge is necessarily false (the so-called 
error theory). Like Kant, he is what I shall call an ontological metaphysical realist, in that he thinks 
that it makes sense to talk of things having an essence independently from the way they appear to 
us. But unlike Kant, he is a disappointed epistemological metaphysical realist: he thinks that human 
knowledge should be able to capture the essence of things-in-themselves, and argues from its 
inability to do so to the radical impossibility of any sort of knowledge, be it empirical or noumenal. 
The way in which he argues against Kant in the following quote is particularly indicative of his 
commitment to a (non Kantian) conception of truth as metaphysical adequation: ‘there is to be sure 
a vicious circle here: if the sciences are right, then we are not supported by Kant’s foundations. If 
Kant is right, then the sciences are wrong’ (PT §84). What underlies the argument is the assumption 
that for the sciences to be right is to capture the essence of things considered in themselves. Thus if 
they are right, their being right is directly grounded by virtue of metaphysical correspondence. One 
can be a happy metaphysical realist, without any need for transcendental idealism or ‘Kant’s 
foundations’. And if Kant is right, i.e. if by definition things-in-themselves are beyond the scope of 
human knowledge, then the sciences are ‘wrong’ because they fail to capture the essence of reality. 
Of course, Kant would say that only if he is right can we be assured that the sciences are right too. 
 
17 Thus ‘from the very beginning we see the visual images only within ourselves; we hear the sound only 




                                                     
The fact that Nietzsche does not see this is indicative of his implicit commitment to metaphysical 
correspondence, which is the first ground for his error theory. 
 As should begin to emerge, this second line of argumentation does not seem particularly 
strong. For one thing, it rests on a misreading of Kant’s intentions in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
and consequently on the sneaking-in of a premise (the metaphysical correspondence requirement) 
which a proper construal of the critical project would have shown as undesirable. Correlatively, it 
presupposes an undue generalisation from the impossibility of empirical knowledge to represent the 
in-itself to the impossibility of empirical knowledge tout court. But it does not follow from the fact 
that human knowledge must fail the metaphysical correspondence requirement that it must also fail 
to adequately reflect empirical states of affairs. Moreover, even if one granted the applicability of 
the metaphysical correspondence requirement to all forms of knowledge, it still would not 
obviously follow from the transcendental idealist’s claim that things or states of affairs are 
unknowable from a transcendental perspective that empirical knowledge could not correspond to 
things as they are in themselves, although of course there would be no way we could know that 
such a correspondence exists, let alone ground it. In other words, our knowledge could happen to 
be metaphysically true (in an adequationist sense), although we could not justify why it is true. As it 
is well-known, this is a particularly thorny issue in Kant studies (the so-called neglected 
Trendelenburg alternative). Nietzsche himself is aware of this possibility, and actually criticises 
Kant twice for having excluded it: thus ‘against Kant, it must be further objected that even if we 
grant all his propositions, it still remains entirely possible that the world is as it appears to us to be’ 
(PT §84). Equally, ‘we should not presume to claim that this contrast [between individual and 
species] does not correspond to the essence of things: that would of course be a dogmatic assertion 
and as such, would be just as indemonstrable as its opposite’ (TL: 83-84). Nietzsche thus rebukes 
Kant for not having been critical enough: he should have seen that the claim that empirical 
knowledge cannot correspond to metaphysical states of affairs is an unwarranted synthetic a priori 
judgment.18 Yet strangely enough, he does not seem to be aware that the criticism would apply 
18 There are ways of at least trying to make the claim good, in particular Allison’s argument that it follows 
analytically from Nietzsche’s considerations about space and time being conditions of possibility of 
representation that they cannot apply to the things-in-themselves, and that therefore the claim that things-
in-themselves are not spatio-temporal is not synthetic but analytic. But as Nietzsche himself does not consider 




                                                     
equally well to his own falsification thesis, and that by the same token, he is unjustified in claiming 
that our knowledge necessarily fails to capture any features of things-in-themselves.19  
  At this point, it might be useful to summarise our findings, with a view to identifying the 
play of transcendental and naturalistic elements in the early Nietzsche’s thought. I have suggested 
that he has two distinct arguments against the possibility of objectivity: the first one concerns the 
genesis of representations and is highly ambiguous in that it combines both anti-transcendentalist 
and anti-empiricist aspects. The second rests on his endorsement of a robust form of transcendental 
idealism and of the non Kantian requirement of metaphysical correspondence. However, we are not 
at this point in possession of all the elements in the picture, and must therefore consider the 
additional arguments offered by Nietzsche in TL before drawing any definitive conclusion.  
 Temporarily leaving aside the issue of metaphysical correspondence, Nietzsche returns to 
his analysis of the genesis of representations, but this time from a diachronic perspective. The new 
and important element is that his former analysis of perception as metaphorical is now 
recontextualised within a genealogy which acknowledges that conceptualisation is now needed, and 
tries to explain why. Nietzsche is concerned with showing the ways in which our imagination, 
while originally unconstrained, has progressively been forced to operate in a fixed manner. This 
pre-genealogical account is distinctively Humean in that it insists on the part played by social needs 
and habits in the process, and thus provides naturalistic reasons for the taming (and the forgetting) 
of our ‘primal’ metaphorical power. Starting from the implicit premise that it is necessary for 
human beings to live in society (presumably for Rousseauist reasons having to do with the scarcity 
of natural resources and the natural vulnerability of the species), Nietzsche’s account is developed 
in the following steps: a) for social order to be possible, there is a need for its members to be able to 
19 In Nietzsche’s defence, it could perhaps be said that even if our statements happened to correspond to the 
in-itself, the very conditions under which the problem is set would prevent them from counting as 
knowledge. Interestingly, the situation evoked here seems to anticipate on the Gettier problem: as it is well 
known, one of Gettier’s examples is that of someone who, upon seeing a robot-dog on a lawn, says: ‘there is a 
dog over there’. As the perceived dog is not a real dog, the statement is false (although justified), and thus 
cannot count as knowledge. Gettier then introduces the additional premise that there is a real dog behind the 
robot dog, hidden from the speaker by a bush. Gettier’s conclusion is that although the statement then would 
turn out to be true, it would still not count as knowledge. In the same way, it could perhaps be argued 
(although Nietzsche doesn’t) that if our statements, which are deemed by Nietzsche empirically false because 
of the lack of metaphysical correspondence and thus are not considered as items of knowledge, turned out to 
be metaphysically true, but for reasons which are unavailable to us, they still could not count as knowledge. It 




                                                     
be truthful. It is a ‘duty which society imposes in order to exist’20 (TL: 84): otherwise it would be 
threatened with chaos and could not maintain itself; b) ‘to be truthful means to employ the usual 
metaphors’ (ibidem), i.e. (for Nietzsche) concepts, presumably so that statements are 
communicable,21 verifiable and justifiable. If there was no common reference, or no stability in the 
relation between meaning and reference, then no societal life would be possible; c) yet such 
concepts are themselves deemed false, by virtue of the process of abstraction whereby they are 
obtained; d) consequently, we have the ‘duty to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie with the 
herd and in a manner binding on everyone’ (TL: 84).  
 Clearly, a lot hinges on step c). What is the ground for saying that conceptualisation is 
necessarily a form of falsification? And what exactly is being falsified? Two main reasons can be 
inferred from Nietzsche’s text. The first one is that conceptual knowledge fails to fulfil the 
metaphysical correspondence requirement. This is probably Nietzsche’s weakest argument in that it 
is the least specific (it would apply equally to the primal stream of metaphors): from this 
perspective, it is difficult to see why fixed metaphors would be, as Nietzsche clearly thinks they are, 
worse than unfixed ones. The second reason is reminiscent of the empiricists’ criticism of the 
formation of abstract ideas: it is the claim that concepts are formed a posteriori, through an 
impoverishment of the original perceptual metaphors. The process can be detailed in two steps: 
firstly, the original, singular images are ‘universalised (...) into less colourful, cooler concepts, so 
that [man] can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct upon them’ (TL: 84). Such 
universalisation is in turn made possible by the forced equalisation of individual differences. Thus 
whereas ‘each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals and is therefore able to elude 
all classification’ (TL: 84-5), ‘every concept arises from the equalisation of unequal things: just as it 
is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept ‘leaf’ is 
formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences’ (TL: 83).22 Secondly, we forget about 
this genesis and take concepts to refer to real entities in the world. Thus the formation of universals, 
20 The reference to ‘duty’ in this context could be seen as ironically reminiscent of Kant’s arguments both in 
the Groundwork in ‘Of the so-called right to lie’. Polemically, Nietzsche sees the empirical origin of what 
Kant understands as an a priori moral duty in the need for social order and cohesion.   
21 Cf. WP §569: ‘communication is necessary, and for there to be communication something has to be firm, 
simplified, capable of precision (above all in the so called identical case). For it to be communicable, however, 
it must be experienced as adapted, as “recognisable”. The material of the senses adapted by the understanding, 
reduced to rough ouTL:ines, made similar’. 
22 Nietzsche presupposes that our ability to distinguish different objects is non conceptual: yet one could argue 
that in order to identify a leaf as such in the first place (and thus to be able to tell two leaves apart) one 
already needs the concept of a leaf, and therefore that it is presupposed by the very process of which it is 




                                                     
conjoined with the arbitrary singling out (the ‘arbitrary assignment’, TL: 82) of general properties 
such as ‘green’ which are implicitly referred to substances as their bearers, gives rise to the illusion 
of a world of mind independent empirical entities: thus we ‘proceed from the error of believing that 
we have these things immediately before us as mere objects. We forget that the original perceptual 
metaphors are metaphors and take them to be the things themselves’ (TL: 86). There is therefore a 
double falsification at play: firstly, the original individual perceptual metaphors are solidified into 
concepts; secondly, this process is forgotten and we become naïve realists, believing in the 
independent existence of entities picked out by these concepts. Although Nietzsche does not say it 
explicitly, presumably this allows for the attribution of a truth value to our statements, since such 
entities can then serve as reference and thus make it possible to verify our statements.   
 This is the first appearance of a theme (namely that concepts, and therefore conceptual 
knowledge, necessarily falsify) which offers a second ground for Nietzsche’s error theory. Note that, 
like his first views about the metaphorical character of perception, it is independent from his 
commitment to transcendental idealism, and that therefore it will not be affected by his ulterior 
rejection of the thing-in-itself. Because of its importance, it is worth examining this early version of 
the conceptual falsification thesis in a little more detail. Perhaps the first thing to say that for all its 
apparent simplicity, it is deeply ambiguous in that the nature of the falsified varies implicitly: in the 
quotes given above, Nietzsche first identifies it with ‘each original perceptual metaphor’, but then 
goes on to say that ‘every concept arises from the equalisation of unequal things’ (my italics). The 
example of the leaf confirms that he is now talking about the equalisation of the differences 
between various entities, not perceptual metaphors (thus he talks about it being certain that ‘one 
leaf [ not a perceived leaf] is never totally the same as another’). In the same way, his criticism of 
our picking of properties as arbitrary presupposes a similar realist view of the falsified: thus ‘we 
speak of a “snake”: this designation touches only upon its ability to twist itself and could therefore 
also fit a worm’ (TL: 82). This would suggest that Nietzsche himself occasionally falls prey to the 
illusion he criticises, namely that of the belief in the existence of mind-independent entities which 
pre-exist our perception of them.23  
 Given the general focus of his argument in TL on perceptual metaphors, let’s assume that 
what Nietzsche really means here is that concepts falsify our original imaginative metaphors. In this 
case, the falsification thesis assumes not only that we have from the start the ability to form many 
23 I shall return to this point, and suggest an interpretation of the development of the error theory as a 




                                                     
perceptual metaphors, but that such metaphors can be said to differ from one another. Otherwise, 
the idea of original ‘singular’ images would make no sense, and nor would that of a subsequent 
conceptualisation as equalisation of differences in perceptual content ⎯ all we would have is a 
stream of undifferentiated perceptions which thus could not be individuated enough to be 
falsifiable. But Nietzsche is clear that each perceptual metaphor is ‘a unique and entirely original 
experience’ (TL: 83). Then the question arises of whether we are originally aware that our 
perceptual metaphors are different from each other (as opposed to just having different perceptual 
metaphors). Nietzsche is not clear on this matter, but it seems that there are two possibilities. 
Firstly, if the equalising process of conceptualisation is seen as conscious and intentional, then it 
does require that each perceptual metaphor should be perceived as different from the others from 
the start. Otherwise it simply would not be possible to compare them in order to form the smallest 
possible common denominator (the concept). In this case, the existence of such awareness 
reinforces the anti-empiricist aspect of Nietzsche’s account of perception in the sense that the 
perception of difference as such cannot be accounted for by merely having different perceptual 
metaphors.24 Yet by the same token, one could argue (along Kantian lines) that the idea that it is 
possible to differentiate thus between perceptual particulars without any conceptual input at all is 
dubious. It would seem that in order to have a sense of difference, one needs a minimal conceptual 
framework, including such general concepts as, for example, quantity, unity or succession. 
Otherwise perceptual metaphors would merge into one another and be undistinguishable. This 
picks up on a problem I flagged earlier, namely the idea that it is difficult to understand how the 
imagination could, without the use of any concepts, have the formative and individuating activity 
that Nietzsche attributes to it. Although their content may not be fully articulate, the original 
perceptual metaphors could not stand as distinct ‘images’ without the use, at least of categorial 
concepts.  
 One way out of this problem is to move to the second possibility alluded to above, and to 
construe the equalising process that results in the formation of concepts as unconscious. In this case 
there would be no requirement for us to be aware of the differences between perceptual metaphors. 
Motivated by social need, we could simply react insensibly to such differences in a manner which 
progressively reduces them so that we end up with conceptually structured and thus communicable 
representations. This would be a fully naturalistic account of the formation of concepts, in line with 
24 As it is well known, Kant make a similar objection to Hume about succession: having a perception of 




                                                     
Nietzsche’s insistence on the role of habit and need in their genesis. However it sits uneasily with 
his non empiricist account of the part played by the imagination in the formation of perceptual 
metaphors, and also with other claims which suggest that the formation of the conceptual edifice 
was intentional, deliberate and conscious.25 Furthermore, if there was no awareness of the 
difference in perceptions from the part of the perceiver, then it is difficult to determine the 
perspective from which they could legitimately be said to have been different. The claim can only 
be made from the third person, from the point of view of the philosopher (Nietzsche) who 
retrospectively identifies the differences in perception and diagnoses the equalisation. But how can 
he be assured that such identification is legitimate, and that there really were differences in the first 
place? Not only is he describing a long gone, mythical past, which he says has been ‘forgotten’ (TL: 
84, 86); he is also assuming that it is possible to describe a first person experience (having the 
different perceptions, although without being aware of their differences) from a third person 
perspective, which is made problematic by the private character of such perceptions.26 It could be 
argued that he is relying on an analogy between his current perceptions and the ones attributed to 
the original, pre-conceptual humans. But he is clearly highly aware of perceptual differences. 
Moreover, the simple act of describing the process would transform the original experience, if there 
was one. So both the language of the description and the way in which Nietzsche experiences the 
world are now incompatible with the primitive experience he is trying to describe. In such a case, it 
becomes difficult to provide any argument for the claim that there was a difference in perceptual 
content which would have been unconsciously equalised, because it is impossible to establish the 
truth of the premise. At best the whole reasoning can be seen as hypothetical, which is not the 
modality of Nietzsche’s speech (it is assertoric).  
 So Nietzsche’s original two lines of argumentation, namely his characterisation of 
experience as ‘perceptual metaphor’ and his endorsement of transcendental idealism joined with the 
non Kantian requirement of metaphysical correspondence, are now complemented by a proto-
genealogical account of the ways in which conceptual use has become necessary. This seems to 
culminate in a rather Humean vision of experience: ‘even the relationship of a nerve stimulus to the 
generated image is not a necessary one. But when the same image has been generated millions of 
times and has been handed down for many generations and finally appears on the same occasion 
25 ‘Man now places his behaviour under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried 
away by sudden (...) intuitions. First he universalises all these impressions into less colourful, cooler concepts, 




                                                                                                                                                                       
every time for all mankind, then it acquires at last the same meaning for men it would have if it was 
the sole necessary image and if the relationship of the original nerve stimulus to the generated 
image were strictly a causal one’ (TL: 87). Having forgotten both the part originally played by the 
imagination in the formation of perceptual metaphors and the reductive process whereby concepts 
where acquired, we have ‘convinced ourselves of the eternal consistency, omnipresence and 
infallibility of the laws of nature’ (TL: 87). Prima facie, both the genealogy and its conclusion seem 
to reinforce the naturalistic elements in Nietzsche’s thought. However, they unexpectedly result in 
a substantially different and much more transcendentally inclined account of the way experience is 
structured now, i.e. at the end of the historical process described in TL.  
 The main difference is this: whereas before Nietzsche denied the need of any kind of a 
priori framework constraining the formation of perceptual metaphors, he now states that ‘the 
artistic process of metaphor formation with which every sensation begins in us already presupposes 
[these] forms and thus occurs within them’ (TL: 87, my italics). Such forms are identified as ‘time 
and space, and therefore relationships of succession and number’27 (TL: 87). Other passages specify 
that ‘space, time and the feeling of causality appear to have been given along with the first 
sensation’ (PT §80, my italics), or again that ‘the perceived manifold already presupposes space and 
time, succession and coexistence’ (PT §140, my italics). Two things are worth noting: firstly, such 
claims set Nietzsche even further apart from an empiricist account of the formation of experience in 
that they implicitly reject the idea of a tabula rasa. While experience does rely on some form of 
sensory input, it also requires the existence of a priori elements. Each time we experience 
something, the forms are ‘already’ there, ‘given along with the first sensation’. The forms do not 
cause the sensations (as we have seen, for Nietzsche it cannot even be said that nervous stimuli do). 
Correlatively, their anteriority is not chronological (it would make no sense to say that the forms 
exist before experience as such relations of anteriority or posteriority can only be defined from the 
perspective of experience, i.e. from within the framework provided by such forms). Although they 
can be defined in isolation, they do not pre-exist experience, or exist independently from it. 
Nietzsche seems to think that they shape such experience (as opposed to experience merely 
happening in conformity with them): thus, because of them we ‘bring to things’ their properties 
(TL: 87). This may implicitly motivate (or at least reinforce) his claim that the world as we perceive 
 
26 Remember that in this hypothesis, there is no conceptual element in perception and no common language 
to provide such perceptions a public character.  





it cannot be the world of things-in-themselves, and thus that human knowledge by definition fails 
the metaphysical correspondence requirement. Secondly, Nietzsche does not seem to distinguish 
strongly, as Kant does, between the a priori forms of sensibility and the pure concepts of the 
understanding: time, space, causality, coexistence and succession (neither of the last two being, 
strictly speaking, categories) are placed on an equal footing. This may be partially due to 
Schopenhauer’s influence (since the latter included causality, along with time and space, in his 
definition of the principle of sufficient reason). It may also indicate that in fact, Nietzsche does not 
think that it is possible to consider sensory content independently from some form of 
conceptualisation (we have seen that this was a problem for his view of perceptual metaphors as 
relying purely on the imagination). Yet such conceptualisation should not be seen as requiring a full 
blown, verbal and consciously articulate use of concepts. By placing causality, existence and 
succession on the same level as time and space, Nietzsche seems to hold that perception requires 
minimal ordering, which cannot be provided by time and space alone. We have to be able to judge 
that some impressions happen after others in time, or coexist with them in space. As we shall see, 
this anti-empiricist aspect is reinforced in the later work.  
 Yet although they look transcendental in the Kantian sense, the conditions identified by 
Nietzsche are not truly so. The point of his genealogical account is to show how they have been 
acquired, and how the way we perceive the world consequently changed. Thus by opposition to the 
time when our imagination ran free, we are now ‘forced to comprehend all things only under these 
forms’ (TL: 87, my italics). Moreover, Nietzsche’s proto-genealogy indicates that since 
conceptualisation arose from need and was enforced by habits and forgetfulness (both of the 
singularity of the original perceptual metaphors and of the part played by the imagination), there is 
no rational validation for the necessity of these forms: ‘we produce these representations [of time 
and space] in and from ourselves with the same necessity [i.e. presumably, natural necessity] with 
which the spider spins’ (TL: 87). The ‘transcendental’ elements in perception have an empirical 
genesis: they have their causal conditions of possibility in the rise of new practices (such as societal 
life), and their necessity is only relative to these practices. Thus although Nietzsche’s account of the 
current way we experience the world is certainly not empiricist, it is not truly transcendental 
either. In order to bring out its specificity, it may be useful to refer to Mark Sacks’ distinction 
between transcendental constraints and transcendental features (Sacks 2003: 211-218). The first 
indicates a ‘dependence of empirical possibilities on a non-empirical structure” (Sacks 2003: 213). In 




                                                     
anticipation of what they determine (in the way the transcendental organisation of the faculties can 
be spelled out completely independently of experience in Kant, and in such a way that experience 
must conform to them). This makes it possible, at least in theory, to secure the possibility of 
objective knowledge completely, i.e. in a universal way. It would not make any sense to think of a 
change in transcendental constraints which would result in a change in experience; on the contrary, 
they are what allows us to think the possibility of succession (and thus of change) and to identify it 
in the empirical world. By contrast, transcendental features ‘indicate the limitations implicitly 
determined by a range of available practices (...) to which further alternatives cannot be made 
intelligible to those engaged in them’ (Sacks 2003: 213). To claim that such features exist is to reject 
the empiricist (or naturalist) view that experience is the result of purely associative processes which 
ultimately depend on physical causes (such as changes in the environment, or in the 
neurophysiology of the brain). This accounts for their ‘transcendental’ aspect: they operate like 
transcendental constraints in that they delimit the structure that experience has to conform to in 
order to count as experience. Yet they can only be considered a priori from an artificially induced 
synchronic perspective, if one looks at experience at an instant T and inquires, in a decontextualised 
way, about the necessary structure of such experience. Ultimately they must be replaced within a 
diachronic account (in this case, Nietzsche’s proto-genealogical project) which shows that their 
genesis is dependent on changes in empirical practices (such as the apparition of the need for 
truthfulness in TL). Thus contrary to constraints, transcendental features can only guarantee the 
possibility of objectivity in a limited way, within the context of a certain range of practices. If the 
practices change, so will the transcendental features which ultimately are ‘no more than a shadow 
of necessity cast by whatever practices are current’ (Sacks 2000: 213). This, it seems, pretty much 
captures the spirit of Nietzsche's view: there are some apparently non empirical conditions for 
knowledge, but these are ultimately dependent on empirical circumstances. On the one hand, 
philosophy must ‘bring to light the preconditions upon which the process of reason depends’ (WP 
§487), such as the ‘categories’, ‘Euclidean space’ (WP §515) or the ‘a priori law of causality’ (KSA 25 
= W I 1. Spring 1885. 26 [74])28. Such preconditions work in a transcendental way insofar as their 
validity cannot be verified by empirical means (since such proof would presuppose their use), and 
because it is impossible to identify them with any particular set of practices (thus although TL 
suggests that they appeared along with new practices, they are not identical to these practices). Yet 
on the other hand, ‘the mode under which we know and form knowledge is already itself part of 




our conditions of existence: but (...) this factual condition of existence may be only fortuitous and 
not necessary at all’ (KSA: 25 = W I 1. Spring 1885. 26 [127], my translation. The first set of italics is 
mine, the others, Nietzsche’s). Correlatively, such conditions are not rationally justified but 
grounded in belief: their necessity is psychological, and the truths that they provide are only 
‘conditional’ (WP §515).  
 So while both Nietzsche and Kant are transcendentally inclined in that they have a non 
empiricist view of experience and agree that it necessarily presupposes the use of a spatio-temporal 
and conceptual framework, Kant sees the latter as a constraint, and Nietzsche as a feature. This has 
two consequences: firstly, it makes it even more difficult to tell whether Nietzsche should be seen 
as a naturalist or a transcendental philosopher. The reason is that there is an intrinsic instability (or 
reversibility) to the notion of transcendental features: their existence can equally be seen as an 
argument for the transcendental philosopher (in that the constitution of experience conforms to a 
priori elements which are not accountable for through empirical psychology or neurophysiology) 
and for the naturalist (in that such elements are not a priori in the strong sense of constraints, as 
they ultimately depend on contingent practices which could themselves be accounted for in a 
naturalistic way, especially if one is a ‘soft’ naturalist). One can insist either on the anti-empiricist 
thrust of such an account of experience, or on the fact that the a priori, being empirically rooted, is 
neither universal nor necessary in the non causal, non psychological manner required by 
transcendental constraints. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s proto-genealogy suggests both that the 
possibility of knowledge is contingent on the existence of a specific framework, and that such a 
framework is revisable if the conditions of experience change (and, in fact, has already been 
revised), something a true transcendental philosopher would not accept. Secondly (and 
correlatively), a similar ambiguity carries over to the relation between transcendental features and 
objectivity. The advantage of a transcendental approach over a purely empiricist or naturalist one is 
that if it succeeds, it can guarantee a priori the possibility of an agreement between experience and 
its objects. On such an account, experience can stop (or not happen) but not fail to conform to its a 
priori conditions. The possibility of such conformity is preserved by the notion of transcendental 
features, but in a much more limited way: they guarantee that at a given time, and under certain 
empirical conditions, there will be harmony between the conditions under which we know and the 
structure of the objects we can know. But should the empirical context change, other forms of 
knowledge and other objects will appear (thus in TL, causally related spatio temporal objects by 




truly universal. Whereas the singular and randomly formed character of perceptual metaphors 
made it impossible for our representations to be regulated by any rules and for us to have a shared 
perceptual world, now the use of both a priori forms and concepts can in principle guarantee the 
possibility of a agreement between the conditions under we perceive and the perceived world. 
Nietzsche is well aware of this: ‘all that conformity to law, which impresses us so much in the 
movement of the stars and in chemical processes, coincides at bottom with those properties which 
we bring to things’ (TL: 87). Or again, ‘in all things we comprehend nothing but these forms. For 
they must all bear within themselves the laws of number’ (TL: 87). Yet because of his commitment 
to transcendental idealism and to the metaphysical correspondence requirement on the one hand, 
and of the falsification thesis on the other, this tentative opening for objectivity aborts immediately: 
thus ‘we presuppose that nature behaves in accordance with such a concept. But in this case first 
nature and then the concepts are anthropomorphic (...). The essence of things does not correspond 
to this: it is a process of knowledge which does not touch upon the essence of things’ (PT 150). But 
should his commitment to ontological metaphysical realism and his error theory disappear, this 
would leave in principle leave some scope for a relativised form of objectivity within the framework 
of naturalised transcendental features.   
 
 I now want to look at the ways in which the themes set in place by TL develop both in 
Nietzsche’s middle and late period. As previously, what interests me most is the interaction 
between naturalistic elements, transcendental aspects and their ontological assumptions. I shall 
therefore focus on three main issues: a) Nietzsche’s alleged rejection of transcendental idealism and 
the sort of ontological commitments (if there are any) that follow from it, b) his reinterpretation of 
transcendental features as perspectival ‘conditions of life’ and c) whether it can be rescued from the 
threat posed by the error theory.  
 As pointed out by Clark and Leiter, from HH onwards Nietzsche seems increasingly 
distrustful of ontological claims, and presents two distinct arguments: firstly, in a quasi Allisonian 
way he identifies the possibility of the existence of a noumenal realm as the analytic correlate of the 
notion of perspectival conditions. Thus, ‘it is true, there could be a metaphysical world: the absolute 
possibility of it is hardly to be disputed. We behold all things through the human head and cannot 
cut off this head; while the question nonetheless remains of what of the world would still be there, 
if one had cut it off [i.e.: if epistemic conditions were bracketed]’ (HH I: §9, my italics). Yet 




whatsoever to us because by definition we cannot know anything of such a world which would 
make a difference to our lives: ‘one could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical world except that 
it was a being-other, inaccessible, incomprehensible being-other; it would be a thing with negative 
qualities. (...) Knowledge of it would be (...) more useless even that the knowledge of the chemical 
composition of water must be to the sailor in danger of shipwreck’ (HH I: §9). Thus Nietzsche seems 
to implicitly move from a robust interpretation of transcendental idealism to a more deflationary 
one, focused on the noumenon as a purely negative concept, and then to make the further, 
pragmatic point that we shouldn’t concern ourselves with such a possibility because it is irrelevant 
to us. The underlying idea seems to be that while the robust interpretation of transcendental 
idealism did matter because of its nefarious moral implications (and thus had to be rejected), this 
deflationary view can stand because it is so empty as to be harmless. To this argument, Nietzsche 
adds a second, more ambiguous one: ‘as though knowledge here got hold of its object purely and 
nakedly as the ‘thing-in-itself’, without any falsification on the part of either the subject and the 
object! But (...) the “thing-in-itself” involve[s] a contradiction in adjecto’ (BGE I §16, Nietzsche 
italics). The first part of the quote suggests that the idea that we can know the thing-in-itself is 
contradictory (which certainly follows from its concept, unless such knowledge is inferred 
analytically from the definition of such a thing); but the conclusion suggests that it is the very 
notion of a thing-in-itself which is contradictory. Clark develops the contradiction as follows: ‘we 
can have no conception, or only a contradictory one, of something that would be independent of all 
knowers, and therefore of all conceptualisation, because to conceive of something is to conceive of 
it as satisfying some description or other, which is to think of it as being conceptualisable in some 
way or other’ (Clark 2000: 46-7). Yet this gloss only works at the cost of introducing implicitly a 
different conception of the thing-in-itself than the one indicated in HH. There Nietzsche suggested 
that the metaphysical world is merely the correlate of the bracketing of the transcendental features 
that are relevant to us (what remains if one ‘cuts our head off’), not of the bracketing of any 
epistemic conditions. To recast this in his later vocabulary of perspective, the first idea is that 
things-in-themselves are things considered independently of our perspective; yet a contradiction in 
adjecto can only be made good if things-in-themselves are thought of as entirely extra-perspectival. 
Only then does it become possible to argue, as Clark does, that the very existence of the definition 
presupposes that of a perspective from which it originates, and therefore that there is a latent 




                                                     
 Prima facie, later Nietzsche makes a move of that sort when he claims that a ‘thing’ (both in 
its traditional sense, as substance, and in its more Kantian understanding as thing-in-itself) is 
nothing more than ‘the sum of its effects (WP §551). According to this logic, ‘the “thing in-itself” is 
indeed nonsensical. If I remove all the relationships, all the properties, all the activities of a thing, 
the thing does not remain over’ (WP §558). As pointed out by Poellner, it is dubious whether this 
argument would truly apply to Kant29; at any rate, it is clearly designed to deny the possibility of 
strong metaphysical ontological realism by invalidating the claim that there is a way in which 
things are in themselves. Thus ‘the in-itself” is even an absurd conception: a “constitution in-itself” 
is nonsense; we possess the concept “being”, “thing”, only as a relational concept’ (WP §583). 
However, it does not follow from this that it would make no sense to ask again, as Nietzsche himself 
did in HH, whether some X would remain if our perspectival conditions were bracketed. Although 
the idea that such X could have a self-standing essence, definable independently from any 
perspective, has just been rejected, and although we couldn’t say anything positive about it, there 
could be other perspectives from which such an X could be considered. Very interestingly, it is this 
very possibility that a passage from the Gay Science considers, in terms which are strikingly similar 
to those of HH: ‘how far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence 
has any other character than this (...) ⎯ that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and 
most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self examination of the intellect: for (...) we cannot 
look around our own corner. (...) But I should think that today we are at least far from the 
ridiculous immodesty that would be involved in decreeing from our corner that perspectives are 
permitted only from this corner’ (GS V §374). Thus the critical project (the ‘scrupulously 
conscientious … self examination of the intellect’) can only carry us to the limits of our own 
perspective: we cannot transcend the conditions by which our experience is structured. However 
such a critique also reveals that our perspective is not the only possible one, although it is the only 
one which we can understand. Thus ‘let’s say that [what ‘we believe in most, all the a priori’] 
presents itself as a condition of existence for our species ⎯ a sort of fundamental hypothesis. This is 
why other beings could make other hypotheses, four dimensions for example’ (KSA 25 = W I 1. 
Spring 1885. 25 [307]). It is conceivable that there could be a plurality of perspectives, each with its 
own kind of a priori conditions (thus ‘some beings might experience time backwards, or 
alternatively forward and backward’, GS V §374), which are incommensurable: ‘it is likely that 
there are numerous kinds of intelligences, but each has its own laws which make it impossible for it 




                                                     
to represent another law’ (KSA M III 1. Spring-autumn 1881 11[291]). The existence of these other 
perspectives is enough to warrant a minimal ontological commitment to the possibility of there 
being some X considered independently from us, but not from any perspective. Most importantly, 
however, Nietzsche does not say that there is such an X, only that perspectivism allows us to 
conceive of such a possibility. Thus his position in his later work is more subtle than is usually 
allowed for: although he rejects the notion of things-in-themselves as over-determined, he does not 
make the (equally strong) claim that if the conditions that structure our experience were bracketed, 
nothing would remain. By contrast, his criticism of the thing-in-itself and the fact that he 
acknowledges the possibility of a plurality of perspectival conditions (as opposed to single, universal 
constraints) lead him to remains agnostic about ontological commitments. Importantly, this 
removes one of the grounds of his error theory: if whatever remains if our epistemic conditions are 
bracketed has no ‘constitution in-itself’, then metaphysical correspondence cannot be a 
requirement.30  
 This subtle reflection on the ontological commitments of transcendental idealism is 
accompanied by a deepening of Nietzsche’s understanding of transcendental features, now 
reinterpreted as part of the perspectival conditions that make possible human experience and life.31 
Thus ‘the belief in the truth [of synthetic a priori judgments] is necessary, as a foreground belief and 
visual evidence belonging to the perspective optics of life’ (BGE I §11, my italics). The existence of 
transcendental features is the reason why although each empirical individual’s particular 
perspective may vary depending on this individual’s idiosyncrasies, interests and situation, all the 
objects that are singled out by human perspectives will share a few common, structural traits ⎯ in 
particular, being spatio-temporal, having an objective order of succession, being interconnected by 
the law of causality.32 Yet just as in his early work, Nietzsche seems uneasy with this idea. This 
dissatisfaction is expressed by the many statements that suggest that our knowledge, although 
30 Given the incommensurability of perspectives, it would not make sense either to require that the empirical 
knowledge we form should be valid cross-perspectivally. The implicit correlate of Nietzsche multi-
perspectivism seems to be a form of empirical pluri-realism whereby different entities will be picked out 
according to different sets of transcendental features. Thus instead of ‘the [metaphysical] true world’ we 
should ‘assert the existence of ‘x’ worlds (...). But this has never been asserted.’ (WP §586). 
31 Although no human perspective would be possible without the use of transcendental features, there is more 
to the notion of perspective than just such use. As indicated by Poellner (following Leiter), knowing an object 
from a perspective also means knowing it ‘from the standpoint of particular interests and needs’ (Poellner 
2001: 99). Thus although each specific perspective will by definition presuppose the use of the transcendental 
features prevalent at that particular time, the sort of objects it focuses on will depend on the interests of the 




                                                                                                                                                                       
grounded in unavoidable beliefs, might nevertheless be or even is an ‘error’.33 Such a claim is as 
ambiguous as it is problematic. If read literally, it threatens Nietzsche's own position in three 
different ways: firstly, as seen by most commentators, it creates a potentially fatal self-reference 
problem. Secondly, it seems to render Nietzsche’s reinterpretation of Kant and his naturalisation of 
transcendental constraints into features rather pointless as it makes the resulting epistemology 
incapable of accounting even for the possibility of limited objective representations. Thirdly (as we 
shall see below), a literal interpretation of the error theory would require us to reintroduce 
precisely the sort of substantive ontological commitments which Nietzsche tried to distantiate 
himself from. Given these difficulties, the temptation is strong either to dismiss it, as Clark and 
Leiter suggest, or to minimise it as Nehamas does (Nehamas 1985: 51).34 I shall, however, resist both 
temptations and suggest that the error theory should not be taken literally but seen as a deliberately 
hyperbolic warning against naïve forms of realism and of transcendentalism, which in turn serves to 
reinforce the importance of Nietzsche's own naturalisation of the transcendental.  
 Before developing this argument, let us take a closer look at the literal interpretation of the 
error theory: it is fuelled by two separate arguments which both deepen Nietzsche's naturalisation 
of the transcendental. As seen by Stack, the first one rests on his use of evolutionary psychology. 
While he accepts that our experience presupposes certain a priori conditions without which it 
couldn’t be the experience it is, Nietzsche now gives a Darwinian35, twist to such conditions: they 
are ‘conditions of life’, in the dual sense that they have evolved with our form of life, and are 
required for such life to maintain itself and develop. Thus ‘if we establish what is necessary 
according to our current way of thinking, we have proved (...) only what “makes possible” our 
existence by virtue of experience ⎯ and this process is so ingrained that to try and turn thought 
away from it is impossible. Any a priori is located there’ (KSA M III 1. Spring-autumn 1881 11[286], 
Nietzsche’s italics). So while Kant started from experience and asked about the non empirical 
conditions that ‘made it possible’ in the transcendental sense, Nietzsche recontextualises such 
 
32 Cf. Poellner 2001; 88-98. All spatio-temporal objects have characteristics that mark them as represented 
(what he calls the ‘essential representation-dependence thesis’).  
33 For the weaker version of the error theory, see for example GS 121 (‘life is no argument. The conditions of 
life might include error’); WP 483 (‘a belief can be a condition of life and nonetheless be false’), 487 (‘a belief, 
however necessary for the preservation of a species, has nothing to do with truth’), 497 (cf. main text), 515 
(idem). For a stronger version, see HH I §11 , BGE 4, 24; TI ‘Reason in Philosophy’, §5, WP 493 (‘truth is the 
kind of error without which a certain species could not live’), 512 (‘the will to logical truth can be carried 
through only after a fundamental falsification of all events’), 517 ). 
34 Thus the error theory would just express the lack of a God’s eye perspective.  
35 As argued by Richardson (2004), most of the time Nietzsche is de facto in agreement with Darwin, and only 




                                                     
conditions within an evolutionary perspective and suggests ironically that having a certain form of 
experience (which does presupposes these ‘a priori’ conditions) is what ‘makes possible’ (in the 
causal sense, this time) human life, and was therefore evolved (along with its a priori conditions) so 
as to preserve and enhance such life. To put it plainly, we have become ‘hard-wired’ to use ‘a priori’ 
concepts and forms and to believe in the reality of the resulting objects; but the existence of such 
hard wiring is no guarantee for the truth of the resulting judgments. Thus ‘it is high time to replace 
the Kantian question, “how are synthetic a priori judgments possible” by another question, “why is 
belief in such judgments necessary” ⎯ and to comprehend that such judgments must be believed to 
be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they might, of course, be 
false judgments for all that!’ (BGE I §11, Nietzsche’s italics). Another passage develops a similar idea: 
‘‘the law of a priori causality ⎯ that it is believed may be a condition of existence for our species; 
for all this, it is not proved’  (KSA 25 = W I 1. Spring 1885. 26 [74], Nietzsche's italics).36 The a priori 
conditions of possibility of experience are ultimately ‘conditions of existence’: their necessity is only 
relative to our need to believe in them, and their ‘truth’ only reflects the empirical conditions they 
result from. However, as such this argument is not decisive: it does not follow from this Darwinian 
naturalisation of the transcendental that our knowledge is false ⎯ and in many passages, including 
all the quotes given above, Nietzsche himself is careful to only suggest that it might be the case. All 
that follows is that it is not true in the absolute, universal sense that would be guaranteed by the 
existence of transcendental constraints.  
 The second argument for the literal interpretation of the error theory is grounded in a 
further naturalisation of the transcendental, this time through an analysis of language which 
naturalises the Kantian categories. Nietzsche does not dispute that such primary concepts as 
‘substance’ or ‘causality’ are presupposed by the way we experience the world. Yet contrary to Kant 
(and in line with the spirit of his early argument in TL), he does not view such concepts as truly a 
priori: he traces their genesis to the existence of specific grammatical features present in all indo-
european languages, in particular the subject/object structure and the active/passive modes (from 
which are respectively derived the notions of subject and substance on the one hand, and of 
causality on the other). Thus ‘positing as “true a priori” our belief in the concept of substance (...) is 
simply a formulation of our grammatical custom which adds a doer to every deed’ (WP 484); in 
other words, ‘the concept of substance is a consequence of the notion of the [grammatical] subject’ 
36 Cf. also WP497: ‘the most strongly believed a priori “truths” are for me ⎯ provisional assumptions, e.g. the 




                                                                                                                                                                       
(WP 485).37 More generally, we are governed by our ‘faith in grammar’ (TI VI: 5; cf. also TI III: 5). 
Nietzsche's point is not merely that whenever we speak of ‘things’ or ‘subjects’ or ‘causes’ we project 
onto reality grammatical structures which may be alien to it. The idea is that the very way we 
experience the world and individuate objects (prior to any verbal articulation), being structured by 
the categories, is ultimately shaped by the grammar of a specific and contingent set of languages. 
‘Our thinking itself involves this belief (with its distinction of substance, accident; deed, doer, etc). 
To let it go means: being no longer able to think’ (WP 487). In a way that anticipates the linguistic 
turn in analytic philosophy, Nietzsche argues that the structure of our language shapes our 
perception of the world. We perceive what we take to be independently existing ‘things’, 
interacting causally with each other; but such perception only reflects the fact that our experience 
is made possible by concepts which themselves result from the unconscious reification of 
grammatical structures. Thus ‘we have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live ⎯ by 
positing bodies (...), causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content: without these articles of 
faith nobody now could endure life’ (GS 121). Two points are worth noting: firstly, as above this 
naturalisation of the categories does not yield per se the conclusion that our knowledge is 
erroneous, but merely that its scope and nature are dependent on the kind of linguistic conditions 
that determine it. The fact that we only perceive causally interacting things does not mean, per se, 
that our perception is wrong: it just means that it is dependent on our use of causality as a category, 
which itself is due to a specific characteristic of our grammar. Secondly, in many quotes what 
Nietzsche seems to object most to is not so much our use of grammar (and thus the existence of 
transcendental features), which is unavoidable, as the fact that we are unaware of the assumptions 
and consequences of such use. As we shall see, this may point towards a more fruitful way of 
interpreting the error theory.   
 Still, there is no doubt that Nietzsche's naturalisation of the transcendental leads him to 
express skepticism about human knowledge. Yet as indicated above, none of the arguments 
provided yield per se the conclusion that all human knowledge is erroneous. For the literal 
interpretation of the error theory to validate such a conclusion, two additional premises are needed, 
namely a) that the world is otherwise than the way we construe it, and b) that our knowledge fails 
 
reason truths? What a conclusion! As if the preservation of man was a proof of truth’.  
37 Cf. also WP 631: ‘the separation of the “deed” from the “doer”, (...) of the process from something which is 
not process but enduring substance, thing, body, soul, etc ⎯ the attempt to comprehend an event as a sort of 
shifting and place ⎯ changing on the part of a “being”, of something constant: this ancient mythology 





                                                     
to correspond to it. Whether this can be made good depends, in turn, on how premise a) is 
construed, i.e. on the nature of the allegedly falsified world: Nietzsche’s texts lend themselves to 
two possible interpretations ⎯ phenomenological and ontological. Before offering in conclusion my 
own, non literal reading of the error theory, I shall now provide a brief reductio ad absurdum of 
these two possibilities by showing that neither of them can be accepted without committing 
Nietzsche to gross inconsistencies. 
 The first, phenomenological, candidate is what Nietzsche calls the ‘fuzziness and chaos of 
sense impressions’ (WP § 569):  thus ‘there is in us a power to order, simplify, falsify, artificially 
distinguish. “Truth” is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations’ (WP §517).38 As 
indicated above, the idea is that we can only perceive a world which has been ordered into self-
identical, causally related spatio-temporal objects. This ‘world of “phenomena” is the adapted world 
which we feel to be real’ (WP §569). But such reality is merely an illusion. By contrast, ‘the 
antithesis of this phenomenal world is not the “true world” but the formless, unformulable world of 
the chaos of sensations (WP §569, my italics). This interpretation of the error theory does not rest 
on metaphysical assumptions about a mind independent reality to which our perception would fail 
to conform. It seems to be a new version of the idea already present in TL, according to which the 
use of concepts is per se falsificatory. In TL, the view was that concepts result from the equalisation 
of differences between various, non-conceptually formed, perceptual metaphors. Here, Nietzsche 
offers a reverse claim: the a priori use of concepts simplifies the primal stream of inchoate sense data 
which underlies conscious perception. Perhaps the best way to make sense of this idea is to think of 
it in Husserlian terms, and to suggest that such a primal stream of impressions could be understood 
as the ‘hyle’ of perception, ‘sensation contents’ (Ideen I, §85) which are associated through temporal 
and spatial syntheses (passive syntheses in Experience and Judgment), and actively unified into 
intentional objects through the ‘sense bestowing’ acts of the mind. However on Husserl’s view such 
sensory contents are not truly sense data in the sense that they are not objects of awareness (this 
would require a noetic function); moreover, they are never given on their own (since we only 
apperceive intentional wholes for Husserl). They are a dependent aspect of conscious experience, 
which can only be approximated retrospectively, through introspection, and by means of such 
technical procedures as the epochê and the transcendental reduction. Yet try as we may, such 
reflective procedures can only give us access to synthetised unities. Thus while there may be such a 
38 Such a phenomenological reading is evoked, for example, by Granier 1977: 137, Wilcox 1974: 133, 149, and 




                                                     
thing as a hyletic layer, it has no independent existence and cannot be described adequately, only 
evoked by contrast to higher intentional levels, in an abstract manner. Nietzsche’s views seem close 
to Husserl in the sense that, as we have seen, he rejects the idea that we could be aware of raw sense 
data passively registering on the mind. Thus ‘inner experience enters our consciousness only after it 
has found a language the individual understands’ (WP §479). As in Husserl, such process has higher 
level layers: for us to experience something, ‘it must be experienced as adapted, as “recognisable”. 
The material of the senses adapted by the understanding, reduced to rough outlines, made similar’ 
(WP §569). But there are also lower layers, which seem closer to the Husserlian passive synthesis of 
homogeneity: ‘there could be no judgment at all if a kind of equalisation were not practiced within 
sensation’ (WP §532). As in Husserl again (and presumably for the same reason), such a primary 
layer is inaccessible to consciousness: it is ‘another kind of phenomenal world, a kind “unknowable” 
for us’ (WP §569). Yet if this account is correct, then it is difficult to understand how the 
falsification thesis can hold (and Husserl certainly did not draw this conclusion from his account of 
perception). The reason is that presumably something can only be falsified if it can be said to exist 
independently, and to have identifiable intrinsic characteristics which are later distorted in such a 
way that through comparison with the original, we could pinpoint the falsification. Yet neither on 
Nietzsche’s account nor on Husserl’s do the primary layers of perception exist on their own; 
moreover, given the way our minds work it would be impossible for us to know what they are, and 
therefore to judge whether and how they would have been falsified.  
 The second, ontological, candidate for what knowledge allegedly falsifies is the ‘world of 
becoming’.39 According to Nietzsche, such a world ‘could not, in a strict sense, be “comprehended” 
or “apprehended” or “known”; only to the extent that the “comprehending” and “knowing” intellect 
encounters a coarse, already created world, fabricated out of mere appearances but become firm to 
the extent that this kind of appearance has preserved life, only to this extent is there “knowledge”’ 
(WP §520). This second version of the falsification thesis both differs from and complements the 
previous one. It has in common the idea that our experience presents us with a world of idealities, 
the stability of which is made necessary by our practical needs: thus ‘our needs have made our 
senses so precise that the “same apparent world” always reappears and has thus acquired a 
semblance of reality’ (WP §521). The new element is that this time, the object of falsification is not 
immanent to experience anymore, in the way the ‘chaos of sensations’ was supposed to be. What is 
39 For ontological readings of the ‘world of becoming’, see Danto 1965: 89, 96-97), Grimm 1977: 30, 32, and 




                                                     
falsified is a mind independent world, a Heraclitean world of perpetual flux, which changes so fast 
that nothing can even be said to be identical to itself40: ‘the total character of the world, however, is 
in all eternity chaos’ (GS III §109). So the idea is now that there is a fundamental incompatibility 
between our sensory and conceptual apparatus on the one hand, and the ‘real’ world on the other. 
Thus ‘logic too depends on presuppositions to which nothing in the real world corresponds, for 
example on the presupposition that there are identical things, that the same thing is identical at 
different points in time’41 (HH I §11). The result of such falsification is an imaginary world of 
spatio-temporal objects, causes and effects, which we wrongly believe to be real: ‘“reality” is always 
only a simplification for practical ends, or a deception through the coarseness of organs’ (WP §580). 
However, the problem with this reading is that its intrinsic dualism (which contrasts the world of 
stable appearances with the ‘real’ world of becoming) seems to rest precisely on the sort of 
ontological commitments rejected by Nietzsche. It is difficult to see how such a world, which 
supposedly has an independent existence and can only appear to us through the simplifications of 
our minds, and is thus deemed by definition ‘unknowable’, is different from the in-itself criticised 
by Nietzsche. On this interpretation then, later Nietzsche would end up in a worse position that his 
younger self, since at the time of TL he refrained from making any assumptions about the nature of 
the ‘mysterious X’, and pointed out against Schopenhauer that none of the concepts or categories 
used to structure empirical experience could be applied to it. Yet if the ‘real’ world is identified with 
the world of becoming (i.e.: a concept of empirical origin), Nietzsche would be making both these 
mistakes, which seems strange given the care he has taken to move away from the ontological 
assumptions of transcendental idealism. The only way out of this dilemma is to move away from 
metaphysical commitments and to understand the world of becoming as a mind independent 
empirical world. Thus Cox claims that the world of becoming is ‘the world we inhabit and know: 
the natural, physical world, the world of “appearance” (Cox 184). He asserts that this world is 
‘empirically evident’ (188), that it is the ‘physical, natural world that we inhabit and with which we 
40 (One may argue, along Kantian lines, that on such a construal, it would be impossible for us to notice any 
changes, or even to have the concept of change. For unless something can be said to change, we would be 
unable to identify any modifications in the flux of becoming, and thus to even have a notion of becoming).   
41 See also: ‘without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live’ (BGE I §4), 
or again ‘the will to logical truth can only be carried through only after a fundamental falsification of all 
events is assumed’ (WP §512). Some interesting insights about Nietzsche’s views on logic can be found in 
Hales & Welshon 2000, p. 43 sq. The authors argue that while syntactic logic, which provides the rules for the 
manipulation of the operators, connectives, quantifiers etc. of a formal system, does not need such 
presuppositions, semantic logic, which specifies domains of entities, does. Thus ‘in order for the symbols and 
formulas of logic to mean anything or have any applicability, there must be sets of things to which they refer’ 




are familiar’ (193) and which must be understood with reference to Heraclitus. Yet this option 
seems very counter-intuitive, not to say implausible: one would think that the very point of 
Nietzsche’s claims about the world of becoming being chaotic and incomprehensible is to bring out 
the fact that there is nothing ‘empirically evident’ or familiar about it. What is empirically evident 
is precisely its opposite, i.e. the world of stable objects we encounter in experience, and which 
Nietzsche contrasts with the ‘real’ world. 
 
 Thus the literal reading of the error theory, whether construed phenomenologically or 
ontologically, is met with insurmountable difficulties. Yet perhaps something valuable can be 
gleaned from this failure: it may be taken as an indication that the problem, in this case, lies with 
literalness itself. I shall therefore turn to a non literal construal which, I should hasten to say, is 
intended as a tentative answer only: the incompatibility of some of the passages cited removes the 
possibility of a univocal solution to the epistemological quandary resulting from the error theory. 
My hypothesis is that the real target of Nietzsche’s skepticism about knowledge may not be so much 
the possibility of limited objectivity resulting from the use of perspectival conditions as two kinds of 
illusions: on the one hand, our inclination, motivated by the drive for survival, to ignore the fact 
that our experience is determined by transcendental features, which results in metaphysical realism 
or in naïve empirical realism; on the other, the tendency of some philosophers (in particular Kant) 
to take what is merely features for constraints, and to think that universal and necessary knowledge 
is possible, when in fact only relative forms of objectivity are legitimate. To use the vocabulary of 
the quotes given above, the problem may not be so much with our having a grammar, or with the 
world we experience according to it, as with our lack of awareness of such grammar and our blind 
‘faith’ in the mind independent reality of the entities that surround us and which we instinctively 
‘feel to be real’ (WP §569). In that case, we should not read the ‘world of becoming’ literally, as an 
expression describing the true state of the world, but metaphorically, as pointing towards an 
irrepresentable object. The function of such an object would not be to serve as a problematic 
referent for the falsification thesis, but to make us reflect both on the workings of our own minds 
and on our assumptions about the empirical world: the irrepresentability of the ‘world of becoming’ 
draws our attention (a contrario) on the fact that both perception and the perceived objects are 
structured by some naturalised transcendental features, without which no representation is 
possible. By pointing toward the limits of human representation, it allows its structural conditions 




 This suggestion has the advantage of minimising the self reference problem and of 
complementing the main strands of Nietzsche’s thought previously identified: his qualified 
endorsement of transcendental determination, his naturalisation of transcendental constraints into 
transcendental features, and his deliberate agnosticism about ontological commitments. It is clearly 
compatible with, and helps make sense of, the weaker formulations of the error theory; as for the 
stronger formulations, they can more fruitfully be regarded as a deliberately hyperbolic rhetorical 
device meant to signal that what is problematic is not so much the existence of such transcendental 
features (after all they are just the expression of our finitude), but the fact that we have a natural 
tendency to be unaware of their existence. We tend to behave either as metaphysical realists, i.e. as 
if our knowledge was unconditioned and we had direct access to the in-itself, or as naïve common 
sense realists, i.e. as if we could just encounter pre-existing, mind-independent objects in the world, 
without realising that there is an a priori (in Nietzsche's revised sense) agreement between the 
structure of such objects and the conditions under which we know them, and that therefore such 
objects are constituted, not found. In other words, the real target of the error theory would not be 
the possibility of (limited) knowledge itself, but a certain naiveté about its scope and its objects. This 
warning is clearly expressed in the following passage: ‘our knowledge is no knowledge in-itself (...). 
It is our own laws that we project in the world ⎯ even though appearance teaches us the opposite 
and seems to point towards us as consequences of this world, and to point towards these laws in 
their action upon us’ (KSA, M III 1. Spring-autumn 1881 15[9], my italics). Given the ineluctability 
and the strength of the ‘teaching of appearances’, we need the stronger formulations of the error 
theory to help us resist our natural tendency to believe in the pre-existence and independence both 
of the empirical world (of which we appear to be ‘consequences’) and of its laws. What we must 
beware of is not so much the conditioned character of our knowledge  
as our ignorance of the ‘poetico-logical power’ from which it results, and by ‘virtue of which we 
keep ourselves alive’ (KSA III 1. Spring-autumn 1881 15[9]): ‘it is we alone who have devised cause, 
sequence (...) and when we project and mix this symbol world into things as if it existed ‘in-itself’, 
we act once more as we always have acted ⎯ mythologically’ (BGE I §21, Nietzsche’s italics). On 
the reading I suggest, the error theory points out that the problem is not so much the projection, 
since it is constitutive of the way human experience works, as our lack of awareness of our own 
activity, and our corresponding belief in the independent existence of the projected.   
 If this is right, then it becomes possible to interpret Nietzsche’s views on knowledge in a 




aspects: firstly, the intertwining of naturalistic and transcendental aspects in his account of the 
formation of human experience, which culminates in the notion of naturalised a priori conditions 
(transcendental features) and makes it impossible (contra both Green on the one hand, Clark, Cox 
and Leiter on the either) to define him either as a transcendental philosopher or as a naturalist. In 
this, Nietzsche anticipates on later Continental philosophers such as Foucault, who shares both his 
anti-empiricist assumptions about the constitution of experience and his skepticism about the 
possibility of truly necessary, universal a priori constraints. The Foucaldian notion of a historical a 
priori, rooted in and yet distinct from contingent historical practices, presents a similar ambiguity 
(and interest) as Nietzsche’s own naturalisation of the transcendental in that both its necessity and 
its scope are dependent on practices to which it is, however, not reducible, and which presuppose 
its existence  be intelligible. The second important aspect resides in the highly critical dimension of 
Nietzsche’s thought, which manifests itself at two distinct levels: ontologically speaking, through 
his rejection of the formerly endorsed robust, two-world version of transcendental idealism in 
favour of a minimalist, perspectivist ontology according to which it makes no sense to talk about 
things-in-themselves, let alone to attribute them a self-standing essence. All that can be said is that 
should our own perspectival conditions be bracketed, it is possible that others would apply, 
according to which different, incommensurable worlds would be constituted. But what they apply 
to could not be defined independently from these other perspectives, and thus could not be said to 
have any essence in-itself: reality is perspectival through and through. Moreover, while this 
possibility has to be acknowledged, one must be more cautious than Kant himself was and remain 
agnostic about the actual existence of such conditions and worlds. In Kantian terms, the critical 
impact of Nietzsche’s thought here is that the status of the ontological commitments of 
transcendental idealism must be considered as problematic, not assertoric (let alone apodictic). 
Epistemologically speaking, this critical dimension is expressed by the role played by his so-called 
error theory. As we have seen, part of the thrust of his naturalisation of the transcendental is to 
emphasise the fact that a priori conditions do not have any rational validation, but are entailed by 
practices which are necessary for the survival of our species. Thus in order to preserve and develop 
their lives, human beings have to believe in the existence of an ordered, relatively stable world of 
mind-independent entities, with which they can interact causally, and on which they can act and 
obtain results with a sufficient degree of predictability. Correlatively, we instinctively tend to view 
knowledge as the non perspectival identification of the properties of such pre-existing entities. On 




                                                     
something wrong with perception, or that the perceived world is fictitious, but to draw our 
attention to the dependency of both on naturalised transcendental conditions. It is not so much an 
error theory stricto sensu as a hyperbolic warning against uncritical forms of realism. It is not aimed 
against the possibility of a statement being true within a set of perspectival conditions, but rather at 
a set of implicit beliefs: that there are no such conditions (naïve realism), or that our statements can 
be true of all possible perspectives (which would require the existence of universal transcendental 
constraints), or worse, extra-perspectivally (by virtue of metaphysical correspondence). Thus the 
error theory is meant to counterbalance our hard wired tendency to be naïve realists about the 
world and about knowledge.42 While such a tendency cannot be eradicated (precisely for the sort of 
naturalistic reasons pointed out above), it is possible to limit its effects in two ways: on the one 
hand, by exposing it, although in order to do so one will have to constantly fight against our nature 
⎯ hence the deliberately hyperbolic character of the error theory. On the other, by openly 
indexing one’s own statements to their conditions of possibility (hence Nietzsche’s constant 
emphasis on the perspectival aspect of his claims). Thus what makes Nietzsche’s views on 
knowledge particularly interesting, in my view, is that while they clearly very strongly influenced 
both by transcendental and naturalistic concerns, they present a position which tends to overcome 
the opposition between the two trends while taking up one of the most valuable insights of the 
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42 Thus it is meant to deter us from adopting precisely the sort of ‘common sense realism’ advocated by both 
Clark and Leiter. In this regard, the thrust of Nietzsche argument is to suggest that such realism is far from 
being devoid from metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality. It impliciTL:y relies on the claim 
that empirical objects are mind-independent and have intrinsic properties which can be defined 
independenTL:y from the way we access them. Leiter’s gloss of the well known passage about perspectivism 
in GM III §12 is illustrative of this belief: ‘consider a useful analogy. If we wanted to get knowledge of a 
particular geographic area by making a map of it, the kind of map we would make would necessarily be 
determined by our interests. (...) The map corresponding to each set of interests would give us genuine 
knowledge of the area, and the more interests embodied in maps, the more we would know about the area.’ 
(Leiter 2002: 273-4). The striking thing about the analogy is that it presupposes that the area to be charted by 
the various perspectival maps (i.e.: the real) pre-exists to and is independent from the charting itself, which is 
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